Abstract-Cognitive radio has been recently proposed as a promising technology to achieve efficient use of spectrum resources. In this paper, we consider spectrum sharing in a MIMO system where several secondary users (SUs) share spectrum with a primary user (PU). A leakage-based beamforming algorithm is proposed via game theory. The objective is to maximize the sum throughput of SUs subject to the signal-to-leakage-and-noise ratio (SLNR) constraint of SUs and PU interference constraint. The sum-throughput maximization problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, where the SUs compete with each other over the resources offered by the PU. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can achieve a high sum throughput and converge to a locally optimal beamforming vector.
harmful interference induced by the SUs as well as to meet the quality of service (QoS) requirements of SUs.
In the past decade, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technique is fast becoming the most popular technology in wireless systems due to its performance benefits [4] . Therefore, most wireless systems use multiple antennas at the transmitter and the receiver. As a result, it is important to study cognitive radio systems in a MIMO setting. This technological combination results in the so-called cognitive MIMO radio [5] .
For traditional fixed-spectrum-allocation-policy based wireless communications systems, beamforming and power control are recognized as effective approaches to mitigate co-channel interference and thus increase the system capacity. For traditional wireless multiuser systems, power control and beamforming algorithms were widely studied [6] [7] . The multiuser downlink problem was discussed in two different scenarios of spectrum sharing [8] . In the first case, the primary network cooperates with the secondary network to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming weights and total transmission power in both networks subject to signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraints of both primary and secondary users. In the second case, the secondary network jointly optimizes the transmit beamforming weights and its total transmission power satisfying the SINR constraint of the secondary users and maximum tolerable interference constraint of the primary user. The beamforming problem with individual SINR constraints was discussed in [9] , where the goal of designing beamformers is to maximize the SINR.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of beamforming based on the signal-to-leakage-and-noise ratio (SLNR) [9] via game theory in cognitive MIMO systems. Game theory is suitable for analyzing cooperative and noncooperative behaviors among rational decision makers. It has been applied to solve the problem of beamforming for providing the maximum throughput in CR networks. Our aim is to maximize the sum rate of SUs by optimizing the beamforming vectors of the secondary users jointly when the channel state information is known at the transmitter. Note that the authors in [10] considered both power and rate control using a game-theoretical approach, where the SUs were considered as active players in the game. Therein, both theoretic analysis and algorithm were carefully investigated. However, the problem of joint beamforming and power allocation for cognitive MIMO systems is different from the traditional radio networks and to the best of our knowledge, few studies have been performed to the beamforming problem in a cognitive MIMO radio environment.
We consider a CR system where several SUs are operating in the same frequency band as the PU. In this case, the SUs who compete for the spectrum offered by the PU and the cost of using the spectrum is determined by a pricing function. A non-cooperative game model is adopted to analyze this situation and the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. In [11] , we proposed a joint beamforming and power allocation algorithm for cognitive MIMO systems via game theory. However, it did not consider the SLNR and the formulation of the optimization problem is different from the one in this paper. When incorporating the SLNR, the SINRs of SUs are more balanced, which indicates the improvement of fairness of SUs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the system model, the primary network consists of a primary transmitter (PBS) that transmits signals to a single primary user (PU). Within the area of the primary network, a secondary network is deployed which shares the same spectrum resource with the primary network. The secondary network has a single base station (CBS), equipped with M antennas, serving K secondary users (SUs). Throughout this paper, we consider the downlink of the cognitive radio network in which CBS transmits independent signals to K SUs using a uniformly spaced M-element antenna array. The PBS is equipped with an L-element antenna array. A block diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 1 . The transmitted signal vector of SUs is compactly written as
where j s denotes the transmitted data intended for user j,
is a beamforming vector. In this paper, we assume that all the SUs are homogeneous and experience independent fading. The received signal at the i-th SU is given by (2) where [ ] 
For each user i, we expect that its signal power
is large compared to the noise power at its receiver (i.e., 
Using this notion of leakage, we can formulate an optimization problem which instead of dealing with the total interference of all users on user i as in (4), but deals with the total interfering power that user i causes on all other users. Specifically, we would like to select
, such that (5) is maximized over i f . In order to allow the SUs to share the spectrum with the PU, we should investigate appropriate beamforming weights to distribute them among the users so that the sum throughput of SUs is maximized, and the interference caused to the PU is as small as possible.
Thus, the optimization problem can be formally stated as follows:
. .
where th I and γ are the given values with respect to the interference power and SLNR, respectively.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME

A. Utility Function
Game theory is used in the hypothesis that players act rationally, in the sense that each player has a payoff function that it tries to optimize, it is an effective tool to analyze competitive optimization problems. The SU selfishly chooses a strategy to increase its own utility, Thereby, the strategies chosen by different SUs depend on each other. Based on the system model described above, a non-cooperative game can be formulated as follows:
is the set of players corresponding to the SUs. The strategy of each of the players is the beamforming weights (denoted by i f for secondary user i), which is non-negative. The resulting utility (payoff) function of SU i is denoted as ( ) u ⋅ . SINR can be taken as the optimization variable. Due to greediness, each player focuses on the forming of its own beam without nulling the interference to the PU. To prevent this selfish circumstance, pricing has been used as an effective tool to give distributed players incentives to cooperate in resource usages. Therefore, the payoff function should consist of revenue and cost. Specifically, the new utility function of the i-th SU with pricing is rewritten as follows:
where λ and α are constant, λ is the price factor. α is an adjustable parameter, which lets the curve of the utility function to be steep. Thus, a non-cooperative game is formulated as:
Here, each SU competes against the others by choosing its beamforming vector i f to maximize its own utility function.
B. Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a stable outcome of a game. At the NE point, no user has any incentive to change its strategy with its own action. According to the fundamental game theory result, the existence conditions of Nash Equilibrium are given in [11] 
By setting these first derivatives to zero, we get
Moreover, by taking the second derivative of ( ) 
It is easy to check that ( )
. Consequently, the existence of the Nash equilibrium is proven for the proposed strategic non-cooperative game.
C. The Beamforming Algorithm
In the following, in order to maximize the sum rate of SUs while not degrading QoS for the PU, we present an iterative algorithm that repeats the beamforming steps until convergence [14] .
The iterative algorithm is summarized as follows: 1. Set : 0 n = and
Set :
For each user i A
∈ compute the beamforming vector, these are generalized eigenvalue problems as 
3. Repeat Steps 1 and 2 until convergence.
D. Convergence of the Algorithm
The beamforming algorithm can be interpreted as bestresponses in a beamforming game. The existence of Nash equilibrium point follows directly from the results of game theory. The beamforming guarantees the convergence of the algorithm to the Nash equilibrium while minimum interference to the PU is guaranteed.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Computer simulation results are presented in this section to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Specifically, we show the convergence properties of the beamforming algorithm with respect to beamforming weight of each link. For simplicity, we consider two base stations with a single antenna (one PBS, one CBS), a CR network with three SUs, and a single PU. All channel knowledges are perfectly known. We choose three different pricing factors λ , the noise power 2 σ =0.05W, the interference threshold th I =60, the i-th SU maximum SLNR constraint γ = 0.2 dB, respectively.
The channel coefficients are drawn from the Rayleigh distribution.
Firstly, we examine the convergence of the beamforming algorithm with respect to beamforming weight. Fig. 2 shows the convergence of beamforming weight of each secondary link, in which the weight vector initialization is the same as 0. It is observed that the beamforming weight converges to the optimal values in a few iterations. In Fig. 3 we plot the utility of SU1 when the interference to PU caused by SUs is restricted. Moreover, Fig. 4 plots the sum utility of the SUs disparate the pricing factor λ . We observe that the utility of the SUs converges in Figs. 3 and 4 , and decreases as λ increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied a beamforming problem via game theory in a cognitive MIMO system. The goal is to maximize the sum throughput of SUs under the SLNR constraint of SUs and the PU interference constraint. The sum throughput maximization problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game. We choose a proper utility function with pricing to characterize the data transmission of all SUs. Moreover, we propose an iterative algorithm that computes locally optimal beamforming vectors. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can achieve a high sum throughput. 
